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Introduction 
Tajikistan is judged to be highly vulnerable to risk, including food insecurity risks and climate 
change risks.  By some vulnerability measures it is the most vulnerable among all 28 countries in the 
World Bank’s Europe and Central Asia Region – ECA (World Bank 2009). The rural population, 
with its relatively high incidence of poverty, is particularly vulnerable. The Pilot Program for 
Climate Resilience (PPCR) in Tajikistan (2011) provided an opportunity to conduct a farm-level 
survey with the objective of assessing various dimensions of rural population’s vulnerability to risk 
and their perception of constraints to farming operations and livelihoods. The survey should be 
accordingly referred to as the 2011 PPCR survey.  
 
The rural population in Tajikistan is highly agrarian, with about 50% of family income deriving 
from agriculture (see Figure 4.1; also LSMS 2007 – own calculations). Tajikistan’s agriculture 
basically consists of two groups of producers: small household plots – the successors of Soviet 
“private agriculture” – and dehkan (or “peasant”) farms – new family farming structures that began 
to be created under relevant legislation passed after 1992 (Lerman and Sedik, 2008). The household 
plots manage 20% of arable land and produce 65% of gross agricultural output (GAO). Dehkan 
farms manage 65% of arable land and produce close to 30% of GAO. The remaining 15% of arable 
land is held in agricultural enterprises – the rapidly shrinking sector of corporate farms that 
succeeded the Soviet kolkhozes and sovkhozes and today produces less than 10% of GAO (TajStat 
2011) 
 
The survey conducted in May 2011 focused on dehkan farms, as budgetary constraints precluded the 
inclusion of household plots. A total of 142 dehkan farms were surveyed in face-to-face interviews. 
They were sampled from 17 districts across all four regions – Sughd, Khatlon, RRP, and GBAO. 
The districts were selected so as to represent different agro-climatic zones, different vulnerability 
zones (based on the World Bank (2011) vulnerability assessment), and different food-insecurity 
zones (based on WFP/IPC assessments). Within each district, 3-4 jamoats were chosen at random 
and 2-3 farms were selected in each jamoat from lists provided by jamoat administration so as to 
maximize the variability by farm characteristics. The sample design by region/district is presented in 
Table A, which also shows the agro-climatic zone and the food security phase for each district. The 
sample districts are superimposed on a map of food security phases based on IPC April 2011. 
 
                                                          
1
 This article is based on research carried out as part of the Pilot Program for Climate Resilience (PPCR) in Tajikistan, 
Phase 1, Component A5, Agriculture and Sustainable Land Management (SLM), February-August 2011. 
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Table A. Sample structure by oblast/rayon 
Oblast Rayon 
Number of 
interviews 
Agro-climatic zones Food security phases  
(IPC April 2011) 
Khatlon Bokhtar 8 6 (S lowlands) 2 – borderline 
Khatlon Kabodiyon 3 6 (S lowlands) 2 – borderline 
Khatlon Muminabad 8 8 (NE hills) 2 – borderline 
Khatlon Temurmalik (Sovetskii) 8 7 (SE hills) 3 – acute crisis 
Khatlon Farkhor 9 6 (S lowlands) 2 – borderline 
Khatlon Shaartuz 7 6 (S lowlands) 2 – borderline 
Total Khatlon  43   
RRP West Rasht 8 3 (RRP-Sughd) 4 – emergency 
RRP East Varzob 8 3 (RRP-Sughd) 2 – borderline 
RRP East Vahdat – mountains 8 5 (W hills) 2 – borderline 
RRP East Vahdat – lowland 8 5 (W hills) 2 – borderline 
RRP East Rudaki 8 5 (W hills) 2 – borderline 
RRP East Shahrinav 8 4 (W lowlands) 1 – food secure 
Total RRP  48   
Sughd Asht 9 1 (N lowlands) 3 – acute crisis 
Sughd Ghonchi 10 2 (S hills) 3 – acute crisis 
Sughd Penjikent 8 2 (S hills) 3 – acute crisis 
Total Sughd  27   
GBAO Roshtqala 11 10 (SW GBAO) 2 – borderline 
GBAO Shugnan 13 10 (SW GBAO) 2-- borderline 
Total GBAO  24   
Total sample  142   
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The sample included dehkan farms (DF) of different organizational forms: individual DF, single-
family DF, DF based on an extended family, “collective” dehkan farms based on families without 
blood relations, and corporate farms (agricultural cooperatives and share companies). Table B 
shows the proportion of farms of different types in the sample. Given the sample selection process, 
these proportions are not representative of Tajikistan as a whole. The survey findings thus provide a 
descriptive picture of the situation in the districts surveyed and are not necessarily generalizable to 
the entire country. 
 
Table B. Farms of different types surveyed, by oblast (percent) 
 Tajikistan 
(n=142) 
Khatlon (n=43) RRP (n=48) Sughd (n=27) GBAO (n=24) 
Individual DF 11 0 17 7 25 
Single-family DF 40 42 44 37 33 
Extended-family 
DF 
24 23 23 19 33 
Collective DF 17 16 12 33 8 
Corporate farms 8 19 4 4 0 
 
This paper presents a preliminary analysis of the information collected in structured face-to-face 
interviews with 142 respondents. The 16-page questionnaire contained 108 closed questions 
organized in nine thematic sections, with the respective findings organized below in 13 separate 
sections: 
1. Land and income 
2. Farm production  
3. The household plot: livestock production and sales mix 
4. Structure of family income 
5. Family well-being and land 
6. Land improvement measures 
7. Cotton production and relations with investors 
8. Debt and access to credit 
9. Gender issues 
10. Cooperation 
11. Climate change and frequency of extreme events 
12. Taxes, social benefits, insurance 
13. Access to information and legal issues 
 
All the results reported in what follows are based on the 2011 PPCR farm survey. Additional sources cited in 
the Introduction are listed under References at the end.
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1. Land and income 
 
Most farms in the survey are small, reinforcing the general impression of Tajikistan as smallholder 
agriculture. For 65% of the farms the size does not exceed 10 hectares (Figure 1.1), but there are a 
small number of farms ranging from 300 hectares to 3,000 hectares (less than 5% of the sample). 
The median farm size is just 6 hectares, but the mean size is 1,640 hectares – biased upward by the 
presence of a small number of large farms.  
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
Figure 1.1. 
 
 
Table 1.1. Farm sizes and structure of land uses 
 
All farms (n=138) 
Size categories 
<10 ha (n=90) 10-50 ha (n=30) 50-300 ha (n=12) >300 ha (n=6) 
Median size, ha 6 3 17 102 1,640 
Average size, ha 92 3.9 21 133 1,691 
Irrigated arable, % 62 69 57 29 28 
Rainfed arable, % 14 13 20 12 11 
Pastures, % 14 7 11 53 58 
Perennials, % 7 9 6 4 1 
Other, % 3 2 6 2 2 
 
Table 1.1 presents some results on farm sizes and structure of land uses. “Large” farms (from 50 ha 
to 3,000 ha) have a much larger share of pastures than “small” farms (up to 50 ha). “Small” farms, 
on the other hand, have a much larger share of irrigated arable land. The share of rainfed arable land 
is roughly constant at less than 15% across all size categories. Figure 1.2 dichotomizes the land use 
structure for farms larger and smaller than 50 ha. The share of irrigated arable land is 66% in 
“small” farms and 29% in large farms; the share of pastures, on the other hand, is 8% in “small” 
farms and 54% in “large” farms. The difference in land use shares between “small” and “large” 
farms is statistically significant. It seems that farms “grow” primarily through addition of pastures.  
Taj survey (n=138): farm size distribution
<10 10-50 50-300 >300
farm size, ha
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Figure 1.2. 
 
There is a distinct progression of size among farms of different organizational types: individual DF 
and single-family DF are the smallest (both by land area and by number of members), while 
collective DF and corporate farms are the largest. Dehkan farms created by groups of families linked 
by blood relations (“extended-family DF”) fall in the middle (Table 1.2).  
 
Table 1.2. Size progression among farms of different types (land area and number of members) 
 All farms Individual DF Single-family 
DF 
Extended-
family DF 
“Collective” 
DF 
Corporate 
farms 
Total land, ha 92 6.7 8.0 56 191 510 
Irrigated, ha 20 1.8 2.1 11 20 254 
Rainfed, ha 11 0.5 2.1 12 37 18 
Pastures, ha 54 0.4 3.3 30 110 326 
Number of 
members 
54 11 11 53 85 300 
 
In most farms (85%) all land is contributed by members. Some lease part of their land from other 
dehkan farms or private landowners (6%) while the remainder (9%) either have land from other 
sources (such as the state land reserve) or do not know what the source of their land is. There are no 
notable differences in land sources across farms of different types. 
 
Fragmentation of holdings does not appear to be a major issue. The respondent’s personal plot is 
divided into 2-3 parcels (2.2 parcels in family-based farms, 3.1 parcels in collective DF and 
corporate farms). The average distance to the farthest parcel is 2.9 km (2.2 km in family-based farms 
and 5.2 km in collective and corporate farms). 
 
Farm management practices suggest that farms today are free from outside interference in their 
production and planting decisions. More than 85% of respondents indicate that the head of the farm 
or the farm members jointly decide what crops to grow and how much land to allocate to each crop; 
in another 10% of farms the decisions are made by the general assembly of farm members (Table 
1.3). The role of the authorities (jamoat or hukumat) and the cotton investors is marginal among the 
farms surveyed. There are notable differences in decision making patterns between the category of 
individual and family farms on the one hand and the collective and corporate farms on the other 
Structure of land use by farm size
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hand. In collective and corporate farms the decision-making process as reported appears to be quite 
democratic: 50% of farms report joint decision by member and 25% report decision by the general 
assembly of farm members. The head of farm does not appear to hold the autocratic role that 
anecdotal evidence assigns to the manager. In individual and family farms, on the other hand, the 
head of farm, who is also the head of family, plays a much more important role: the production and 
planting decisions are made by the head of farm (head of family) in 45% of farms in this category 
and another 48% report joint decision by members; the institution of the general assembly of farm 
members does not exist in family-based farms. 
 
Table 1.3. Who decides what to grow and how much land to allocate to each crop? (percent of respondents) 
 All farms (n=142) Family-based farms 
(n=107) 
Collective and corporate 
(n=35) 
Head of farm (head of family) 37 44 17 
Members jointly 49 48 51 
General assembly of members 9 4 26 
Outside agencies 4 3 6 
 
There are pronounced differences in the procedure for distribution of output in farms of different 
types (Table 1.4). In family-based farms the entire output generally belongs to the family. In 
collective and corporate farms, on the other hand, the prevailing practice is allocation based on the 
family’s share in the farm or, alternatively, allocation by the decision of the general assembly. The 
role of the head of farm in distribution decisions is limited and is essentially the same in farms of 
different types. It is noteworthy that, contrary to widespread anecdotal evidence, the practice of 
paying just a salary to members (without any output sharing) is highly limited.  
 
Table 1.4. Distribution of output in surveyed farms (percent of respondents) 
 All farms (n=142) Family-based 
farms (n=107) 
Collective and 
corporate (n=35) 
Entire farm output belongs to the family 39 50 6 
Family entitled to output from its membership share 27 20 49 
Receive only salary 4 4 3 
Head of farm decides on distribution 17 18 14 
General assembly decides on distribution 11 6 29 
 
2. Farm production 
 
The farms surveyed are heavily biased toward crop production. Fully 97% of respondents report that 
they produce crops; among these 10% produce also fruits from perennial orchards. Farms producing 
fruits have more land in perennials than the rest: 6 hectares compared with 1 hectare, or 29% of total 
farm area compared with just 5%. Livestock production is much less widespread than crop 
production (27% of respondents). Among farms reporting livestock production, virtually all produce 
also crops or fruits: only 2 farms of 142 surveyed (one in Varzob, RRP and one in Roshtqala, 
GBAO) report livestock production without any crops. Processing of farm products is totally 
neglected, with only 4% of respondents engaged in this activity. 
 
Farmers were asked to estimate the share of each farming activity in their total production (Figure 
2.1). Here again plant enterprises are clear leaders: 88% of production from crops and another 3% 
from fruits. Livestock accounts for less than 7% of production; processing less than 2%.  
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There is no distinct pattern of production specialization by farm type. Thus, livestock is produced in 
25%-30% of farms of different types, slightly fluctuating around the sample mean of 27%.  
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
Figure 2.1. 
 
 
How are the mixed farms producing both crops and livestock different from farms that produce only 
crops? The first difference is in the share of pastures: farms reporting livestock production have a 
higher share of their land in pastures and a lower share in irrigated arable land (Table 2.1). This 
differential persists in farms of all types. Second, livestock-producing farms are larger than farms 
that produce only crops (139 hectares compared with 69 hectares). This is consistent with the 
previous observations that more pastures typically implies larger farms. Third, livestock-producing 
farms have more members than crop-specialized farms (102 members per farm compared with only 
36 members in farms that do not have livestock production). This is consistent with the general fact 
that livestock is a labor-intensive industry that requires more working hands.  
 
Table2.1. Comparison of mixed crop-livestock farms with crop-specialized farms 
 Mixed farms (n=39) Crop-specialized farms (n=103) All farms (n=142) 
Land area, ha 139 69 92 
Share of pastures, % 29 7 13 
Share of irrigated arable land, % 56 64 62 
Number of members 102 36 54 
Mean share of livestock in 
production. % 
34 0 7 
 
3. The household plot: livestock production and sales mix 
 
Contrary to dehkan farms, the operations on the household plot appear to be biased toward livestock 
more than crops. Only 27% of dehkan farms have livestock operations; among household plots, on 
the other hand, fully 92% keep livestock. Virtually all of these household plots (98%) have cattle:  4 
cows and 1 bull on average. In addition, there are 16 sheep and 6 chickens on average. Sheep are 
kept by less than 50% of households and poultry is curiously reported by a mere 20%. The 
households that keep sheep (48% of the sample) have more sheep per household than the average 
for all households with animals (31 sheep compared with 16), but the difference is not statistically 
Structure of farm production (n=123)
Crops
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significant. The number of cattle, on the other, does not differ much between the two categories of 
households. As a result, the total herd is practically the same – about 7 standard head in both 
categories (Table 3.1; standard head are calculated by taking 10 sheep or goats and 100 birds 
equivalent to one head of cattle). Poultry, for some reason, is of marginal importance in all 
households. In households that actually report poultry, the average number of birds is 30 (compared 
with the sample mean of 6), which is quite low.  
 
Table 3.1. Animal headcount in households 
 All households with animals (n=131) Households with sheep (n=68) 
Mean, head Median, head Mean, head Median, head 
Bulls 1  1  
Cows 4  3  
Cattle 5 3 4 4 
Sheep and goats 16 3 31 10 
Chickens 6 0 10 0 
All animals, st. head 6.7 4 7.5 5 
 
The distribution of cattle (cows and bulls) and sheep and goats is shown in Figures 3.1 and 3.2. 
Less than 10% of households in the survey are without any cattle and 37% have one or two animals. 
On the face of it, close to 50% of households fall in the category that WFP classifies as “vulnerable” 
by animal headcount. This, however, is a very restrictive view of vulnerability, as it looks at a single 
endowment – cattle, and furthermore focuses on the household plot, ignoring the dehkan farm that 
may exist over the family holdings. Overall, 68% of households have between 1 and 4 head of 
cattle. The median headcount is 3 (compared with mean 5). Sheep and goats are kept in 48% of 
households only (all of these also have cattle). The median headcount is 10 sheep (compared with 
mean 30), with 57% of households reporting between 5 and 20 sheep. 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
Figure 3.1. 
 
Distribution of cattle headcount in households
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Figure 3.2. 
 
 
 
Livestock sales represent 56% of total sales revenue from household plots, most of it from sale of 
live animals. Dehkan farm sales, on the other hand, are mostly crops, with livestock accounting for 
less than 10% of total sales revenue.  Two additional notable differences between sales of dehkan 
farms and household plots concern cotton and fruits: household plots neither produce nor sell cotton, 
while in dehkan farms cotton accounts for 36% of sales revenue; fruits represent 17% of sales 
revenue from household plots and only 5% in dehkan farms (Table 3.2).  
 
Table 3.2. Structure of sales revenue in dehkan farms and household plots (percent) 
 
Dehkan farms (n=104) Household plots (n=57) 
Cotton 36 0 
Cereals 21 10 
Potatoes and vegetables 30 15 
Fruits 5 17 
Milk 3 20 
Animals 5 36 
Meat 0.1 1.5 
 
About half the households with livestock report sale of live animals. During the year, these 
households sell more than half their cattle inventory (4 head of cattle out of total 7) and one-third of 
their flock of sheep (8 sheep out of total 23). The average revenue from the sale of live animals was 
3,500 somoni  in 2010 (for the 60 households reporting such sales). The price per animal estimated 
from the survey is shown in Table 3.3. 
 
Table 3.3. Average price per animal sold (somoni) 
 Number of farms reporting full sales data 
(out of n=131 with livestock) 
Average price per animal sold, somoni 
Bulls 24 2,200 
Cows 21 1,700 
Sheep 22 330 
 
Distribution of sheep and goats in households
Based on 68 households (48%) reporting sheep or goats
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Nearly 50% of households graze their animals on jamoat’s communal pastures and another 30% 
graze them on dehkan farm pastures. Of the remaining 20%, most report feeding their animals “at 
home”, in the barn, and only 5% send their animals to graze on road verges and field stubble. 
Virtually all households that use communal pastures pay for grazing: the payment is 20 somoni per 
head of cattle and 6 somoni per sheep or goat (presumably for the entire season). The payment to 
dehkan farm for use of its pastures is higher (46 somoni per head of cattle, 23 somoni per head of 
small ruminant), but the number of responses in this category is very small, involving large errors in 
estimates. 
 
Veterinary services are used universally (by 95% of households with animals). The respondents are 
divided evenly between state and private veterinary services. Payment for veterinary services is also 
universal: 95% of respondents pay regardless of whether they use state or private services. State 
veterinary services charge less than private services: 15 somoni per head in state services compared 
with 25 somoni to a private veterinarian (the difference is statistically significant at p=0.1). 
 
4. Structure of family income 
 
More than half the family income derives from agriculture (sales and consumption of own farm 
products; see Figure 4.1).  Remittances are the second most important source, contributing 23% of 
total income. Wages from off-farm sources contribute 12% and the remaining 10% is from pensions 
(5%) and non-agricultural business activities (5%).  The respondents estimate that income from the 
household plot (in cash and in kind) constitutes about one-quarter of family income. 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
Figure 4.1. 
There is considerable variability in the structure of income source across oblasts (Table 4.1). In 
GBAO income from agriculture (17%) is much lower than the average in the survey while the share 
of remittances is much higher than the average (50%). Since GBAO is over-represented in the 
sample (21 out of 134 observations, or 16% of the farms surveyed compared with just 3% of the 
population), its low share of agricultural income and exceptionally high share of remittances bias the 
overall survey means. Without GBAO, the mean share of agricultural income rises to 62% and the 
mean share of remittances drops to 18%. 
Structure of family income (n=134)
Wages
12%
Farm sales
35%
Ow n products
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Table 4.1. Structure of family income (percent of total income) 
 Tajikistan 
(n=134) 
GBAO Sughd RRP Khaton Without 
GBAO 
Wages 12 9 12 15 10 12 
Income from 
agriculture 
55 17 51 72 58 62 
Pensions 5 15 1 3 5 4 
Remittances 23 50 31 8 22 18 
Other income 5 9 5 2 5 4 
Total 100 100 100 100 100 100 
 
There are noticeable differences in income structure as a function of farm size (Table 4.2). 
Remittances are less important for relatively large farms: the share of remittances decreases from 
24% in “small” farms with up to 50 hectares to 17% in farms larger than 50 hectares. Large farms 
earn a greater share of their income from agriculture (66% compared with 54% for small farms). 
Table 4.2. Structure of family income for “small” and “large” farms (percent of total income)  
 All farms (n=130) “Small” <50 ha (n=113) “Large” >50 ha (n=17) 
Off-farm wages 12 12 11 
Farm sales 35 34 43 
Consumption of farm products 20 20 23 
Business activities 4 4 4 
Pensions 5 6 2 
Remittances 23 24 17 
 
A slightly different view of income sources is based on the perceived importance of agriculture in 
family income as reported by respondents according to a three-level classification: agriculture is the 
only income source (25% of respondents); agriculture is the main income source, but there are other 
sources also (52%); agriculture is not the main income source: there are other more important 
sources (17%). The majority of respondents thus paint a picture of diversified income sources, with 
agriculture as the main income-generating activity supplemented by other activities. This is 
consistent with the quantitative structure of income sources shown in figure and table above.  
 
In a regional perspective (Table 4.3), the frequency of respondents reporting agriculture as the only 
income is constant across the four oblasts (25%). However, the frequency of respondents reporting 
that non-agriculture income plays a more important role than agriculture is dramatically higher in 
GBAO: 46% of respondents compared with 11% in other three oblasts. Correspondingly, GBAO is 
characterized by a much lower frequency of respondents who rely on a diversified income portfolio 
with agriculture supplemented by other activities (17% compared with 60% in other three oblasts).  
 
Table 4.3. Perceived importance of income-generating activities (percent of respondents) 
 Tajikistan (n=142) GBAO (n=24) Other three oblasts 
(n=118) 
Agriculture is the only income source 25 25 25 
Agriculture is the main source supplemented 
by other sources 
52 17 59 
Non-agricultural sources more important 17 46 11 
No answer 6 12 4 
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Table 4.4 shows that respondents reporting agriculture as their only income source have the largest 
farms (over 200 ha on average) and indeed the highest share of agriculture in their family income. 
However, agriculture is important across all families in the sample: it accounts for more than 20% of 
family income even for respondents who indicate that they rely mainly on non-agricultural sources. 
The share of remittances is low for families with large farms that rely mainly on agriculture for their 
income (9% of family income). It is correspondingly high (over 50% of family income) for families 
with relatively small farms whose income is derived mainly from non-agricultural sources. 
Table 4.4. Farm size and structure of family income for groups with different portfolios of income generating 
activities 
 Agriculture only source Diversified agriculture and 
other sources 
Mainly non-agricultural 
sources 
Off-farm wages, % 10 13 9 
Agriculture (sales and 
consumption), % 
77 59 23 
Business and pensions, % 4 8 16 
Remittances, % 9 20 52 
Mean farm size, ha 207 70 16 
Median farm size, ha 7.5 5.8 3.0 
 
5. Family well-being and land 
 
Although the survey does not provide the absolute level of family income in somoni, it contains 
three relatie well-being indicators: how do you compare your situation to the rest of the village 
(q103), what does your family budget buy (q105), and are you optimistic about the future (q104). 
Because of the small number of cases, these three indicators were transformed by dichotomizing the 
multiple-value answers into binary values: “better than the village average” versus “not better”; 
“budget allows a comfortable consumption regime” versus “the budget buys food and daily needs 
only”; “respondent optimistic about the future” versus “not optimistic”. The average farm size and 
the income structure were then estimated from the survey for each of the binary categories. The 
results are quite striking: all “better” well-being categories have more land than the other categories. 
Furthermore, in “better” well-being categories we have a significantly higher share of income from 
agricultural sales and a significantly lower share of income from remittances; in “poorer” well-being 
categories the share of income from agricultural sales is lower (less land!) and the share of 
remittances is higher. Table 5.1 presents an illustration of these findings.  
Table 5.1. Farm size and income structure for various well-being categories 
 Comparison to village 
average (q103) 
What the family can afford to 
buy (q105) 
View of the future (q104) 
Better than 
the village 
average 
Not better  Comfortable 
consumption 
regime 
Food and 
daily needs 
only 
Optimistic Not 
optimistic  
 N=43 N=99 N=79 N=62 N=71 N=71 
Mean farm size, ha 157 65 142 29 155 30 
Income structure, %:       
Wages 15 10 12 12 12 12 
Ag sales 51 29 41 29 42 30 
Own products 10 24 19 21 20 19 
Non-ag 8 10 8 11 7 12 
Remittances 18 26 20 29 19 29 
 
13 
 
The observation that higher well-being is associated with more land is a new survey-based result for 
Tajikistan, although it has been previously established for other CIS countries. There is evidence for 
many CIS countries that more land in family farms and households translated into higher incomes 
and higher well-being. Table 5.1 now shows that the same relationship between land and well-being 
(or income) is valid also for Tajikistan.  
The finding concerning the share of income from agricultural sales (Table 5.1) provides a new proof 
of another land-related effect for Tajikistan: as we observe in other CIS countries, here also more 
land leads to a higher level of commercialization (more sales) and with it to a higher level of well-
being. Thus, land has a two-fold effect: it directly increases income through production and it 
indirectly increases income by increasing sales, which in turn increase income. 
Figures 5.1 and 5.2 visualize the relationship between land and well-being and illustrate how the 
main components of family income differ for different levels of well-being. 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
Figure 5.1. 
  
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
Figure 5.2. 
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6. Land improvement measures 
 
Tajik farmers widely apply various measures for land improvement and prevention of soil 
degradation. Overall, more than 90% of farmers report using some from a range of 10 land-
improvement measures. The usage frequency is significantly lower only in GBAO, where the 
number of respondents using land-improvement measures drops to 75% (Table 6.1).  
Table 6.1. Frequency of application of land improvement measures by oblast 
 Percent respondents (n=142) 
Apply any measure 92 
Khatlon 95 
RRP 94 
Sughd 100 
GBAO 75 
 
The most popular land improvement measures include attention to soil fertility by application of 
fertilizer and use of crop rotation (Table 6.2). These two techniques are actually combined in more 
than 50% of the cases, which implies that crop rotation – a natural fertility conserving measure – is 
virtually always used in conjunction with fertilizer application – an “industrial” agronomic measure. 
Another natural method to maintain soil fertility -- planting perennial grasses -- is also fairly 
popular, but in most cases it is used in combination with crop rotation, not as an independent 
measure. Maintenance and improvement of irrigation systems ranks third among the most 
widespread measures. The use of less conventional measures, such as agro-forestry techniques 
(shelterbelts between fields, conversion of arable land to orchards), terracing, and pasture fencing, is 
still marginal. 
Table 6.2. Record of land improvements: what land improvement measures have you applied? (percent of 
respondents) 
Measure PPCR survey (n=142) Helvetas survey, March 2011 (n=420) 
Irrigation system improvement 36 47 
Soil fertility (apply fertilizers)  87 (51% also crop rotation) 84 
Crop rotation 55 (16% also grasses) 38 
Sowing perennial grasses 19 (16% also crop rotation) 9 (2% with rotation) 
Shelterbelts between fields 4 n.a. 
Planting trees on arable land 3 9 
Converting arable land to orchards 4 5 
Terracing 0 2 
Pasture fencing 5 0.5 
 
Table 6.3. Land-improvement techniques used by farms applying one measure and two-three measures (percent) 
 One measure (n=33) Two-three measures (n=84) 
Percent of all farms applying land-improvement 
measures  
25 64 
Fertilizer application 85 98 
Crop rotation 9 72 
Irrigation system improvement 6 42 
Sowing perennial grasses  17 
 
Most farms (64%) use 2-3 land improvement measures and only 25% report a single measure 
(Table 6.3).  The single measure is basically application of fertilizer to improve soil fertility (85% 
of those using a single land-improvement measure), with crop rotation and irrigation system 
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improvement – the other two top-ranking techniques – mentioned by few respondents. Farms 
reporting 2-3 land improvement measures focus on the four top-ranking techniques – fertilizer 
application, crop rotation, irrigation system improvement, and sowing perennial grasses. 
7. Cotton production and relations with investors 
 
Only 25% of the surveyed farms grow cotton and less than half of them (12% of all farms) maintain 
relations with investors. There are no cotton growers among individual farms in the survey, but for 
all other farm types the percentage of cotton growers and the percentage of those using investors 
increases from one-family farms to corporate farms (Table 7.1).  
 
Table 7.1. Frequency of cotton growing farms and farms using investor services in the survey 
 All farms 
(n=142) 
Individual 
(n=16) 
One-family 
(n=57) 
Extended-
family (n=34) 
Collective 
(n=24) 
Corporate 
(n=11) 
Grow cotton 25 0 12 32 42 64 
Use investors 12 0 4 12 21 55 
 
There is no other obvious characterization of farms that work with investors: farm sizes and the 
quantity of harvest are not significantly different between farms that use investor services and the 
rest. 
 
Among those who use investor services 76% are satisfied with the timeliness of input deliveries but  
only 53% are satisfied with the prices that investors charge for inputs. 
 
The relations with investors appear to be rigidly binding: among farms that work with investors 82% 
report that they are obliged to sell their cotton to the investor in return for inputs. Only 3 farms 
(18%) purchasing inputs from investors are free to sell their cotton elsewhere. 
 
A total of 26 farms report selling their cotton to alternative buyers. These include 23 farms that do 
not work with investors and 3 farms that are not committed to sell to investors.  Three-quarters of 
the “free” farms (20 farms) sell to the local ginnery (which is often controlled by the investor); the 
rest are equally divided between selling to a ginnery in another district, selling by contract to another 
buyer, and selling ad hoc to a buyer offering the best terms (just 2 respondents in each of the three 
groups). See Figure 7.1. Farmers who sell their cotton through alternative channels report higher 
satisfaction with prices received: the satisfaction rating is 58% for respondents who are “free” to sell 
to any buyer compared with 47% of those who sell to investors (the difference is not statistically 
significant).  
 
A small number of farmers (12, or one-third of all cotton growers) indicate that ginneries in other 
districts may pay higher prices for cotton. However, half of these farmers report that investors block 
them from selling in other districts and another 20% say that the jamoat or the hukumat prohibit 
sales in another district. Finally, 20% say that it is too costly to transport the cotton to another 
district.  
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Figure 7.1. 
 
 
Farms that do not use investors (or do not sell their cotton to investors) naturally have to look for 
alternative sources to finance their working capital need. However, even farms that maintain 
relations with investors sometimes resort to external financing, although to a smaller extent that 
farms not using investors (Table 7.2). Informal credit (borrowing from relatives, friends, and 
neighbors) is the most popular source of financing (36% of all cotton growing farms, 44% of farms 
that do not use investors). It is followed by own funds and formal borrowing from banks and 
microfinance institutions, which are reported by virtually the same percent of respondents.  
 
Table 7.2. Recourse to alternative financing sources for working capital 
 All cotton growing 
farms (n=42) 
Farms that use 
investors (n=17) 
Farms that do not use 
investors (n=25) 
Credit from banks, micro-finance 
organizations 
29 18 36 
Informal credit (friends and relatives) 36 24 44 
Own funds 31 6 40 
 
8. Debt and access to credit 
 
Only 16% of farms surveyed report that they carry debt. Of these, 39% inherited their debt during 
reorganization, while 48% indicate that this is new debt created by current operations. In 13% of 
farms the existing debt is a mixture of inherited and new (Table 8.1).  Family-based farms have a 
lower frequency of debt (12%) than collective and corporate farms (29%; the difference is 
statistically significant). The origins of debt are also significantly different between family-based 
and collective farms: inherited debt accounts for 70% of total debt in collective and corporate farms 
compared with only 15% in family-based farms; new debt created by current operations is 30% in 
collective and corporate farms compared with 62% of total debt in family-based based (which also 
have 23% mixed inherited and new debt – not reported at all in collective and corporate farms).  
 
Cotton growing contributes to debt accumulation: the frequency of debt among cotton growing 
farms is 20%, compared with 9% in farms that do not grow cotton.  
 
Cotton sales to alternative buyers (n=26)
Local gin
77%
Gin another district
8%
Another buyer
8%
Best price
8%
17 
 
For one-third of farmers the nearest financial institution is located in the village; for another 42% it 
is within 10 km from the village; the remaining 25% have to travel more than 10 km to get to a 
financial institution. 
 
Table 8.1. Farm debt (percent of respondents) 
 All farms Family-based farms Collective and corporate 
Farms with debt (n=23) 16 12 29 
Of these:    
Farms with inherited debt 39 15 70 
Farms with new debt 48 62 30 
Mixture of inherited and new 13 23 -- 
 
One-third of farmers indicate that they took a loan at some point in the past. The incidence of 
borrowing in family-based farms is significantly lower than in collective and corporate farms: 25% 
in individual, single-family, and extended-family farms compared with 57% in collective and 
corporate farms. The uses of these loans are presented in Table 8.2. 
 
Table 8.2. Borrowing and uses of credit (percent of respondents) 
 All farms Family-based farms Collective and corporate 
Farms with debt 33 25 57 
Of which for the following 
uses: 
   
Production costs 66 59 75 
Purchase of animals 11 19 0 
Purchase of machinery 13 11 15 
Consumption 2 4 0 
Education 11 15 5 
Ceremonial 6 7 5 
Other (migration, tax arrears) 4 4 5 
 
There is a higher tendency among borrowers to take short-term loans than long-term loans. There is 
practically complete separation between short- and long-term borrowers in the survey, with only one 
respondent reporting both short- and long-term loans. Both the principal and the interest rate for 
short-term loans are smaller than for long-term loans (Table 8.3). The interest rate charged on loans 
is roughly double what the respondents perceive as an acceptable rate (11% per annum). 
 
Table 8.3. Credit terms reported by borrowers (averages for farms that borrow) 
 Frequency, % (out of 
n=47 borrowers) 
Loan amount, 
somoni 
Term Annual interest rate 
Short-term loans 57 9,300 7.5 months 19 
Long-term loans 38 26,400 2.1 years 23 
 
Collateral had to be provided by 75% of those who took loans. The different forms of collateral are 
listed in Table 8.4.  
 
Only 15% of respondents complain of difficulties in receiving credit. For all of them complex 
procedure is the main complaint, although a small number of respondents also mention high interest 
rates and transportation costs. Among those who have never applied for credit (55% of respondents), 
30% indicate that they do not need credit at all, 40% claim they are deterred by high interest rates, 
and 22% are put off by complex bank procedures.  
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Table 8.4. Loan collateralization (percent of farms that borrow) 
 All farms that borrowed 
(n=47) 
Family-based farms 
(n=27) 
Collective and 
cooperative (n=20) 
Provided collateral 75 78 70 
Of which:    
Farm production 3 0 7 
Livestock 29 29 29 
House, farm buildings 60 48 79 
Tractor, farm machinery 11 5 21 
Car 20 24 14 
Jewelry 3 0 7 
Certificate of land use rights 11 19 0 
 
9. Gender issues (based on n=132 cases with consistent numbers for men and women) 
 
Overall, the number of women in surveyed farms is slightly higher than the number of men (Table 
9.1). In individual and single-family dehkan farms, however, the situation is reversed: in these farms 
the number of men is higher than the number of women. It is only in multi-family farms (extended-
family and collective dehkan farms) and corporate farms that we observe more women than men, 
presumably because of fewer internal constraints on the availability of migrant labor. The proportion 
of farms with a female head is fairly constant across different farm types at about 18%. It is slightly 
higher only in corporate farms, but this group is very small (total of 11 farms) and the result is 
statistically unreliable.  
 
Table 9.1. Gender composition of farm members  
 All farms 
(n=132) 
Individual DF 
(n=14) 
One family 
DF (n=56) 
Extended family 
DF (n=33) 
Collective DF 
(n=20) 
Corporate 
(n=9) 
Number of 
families 
14 1.5 1.2 18 44 32 
Members 34 2.0 5.5 53 87 63 
Men 15 1.7 3.0 26 36 22 
Women 19 1.2 2.5 27 51 41 
Woman head 18% 19% 16% 18% 17% 28% 
 
More than one-third of respondents report that women do not make any decisions on the farm 
(Table 9.2). This percentage of women without decision power is particularly high in individual DF 
(56%) and strikingly low in corporate farms (18%), where the proportion of female heads is 
relatively high. The main areas where women make decisions are land use planning (what and when 
to sow) and sale of farm products. In these areas again individual farms have very low women 
participation, while corporate farms allow much higher participation of women in decision making. 
Women make livestock decisions in 20% of all farms, but their share in farms that actually have 
livestock production is much higher (44% of livestock-producing farms). There seems to be a 
tangible link between women and livestock production in Tajikistan.  
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Table 9.2. What farm decisions are generally made by women? (percent of respondents) 
 All farms 
(n=142) 
Individual DF 
(n=16) 
One family 
DF (n=57) 
Extended 
family DF 
(n=34) 
Collective DF 
(n=24) 
Corporate 
(n=11) 
Women do not 
make any 
decisions 
35 56 39 26 33 18 
Land use 
planning 
45 12 44 53 46 73 
Sale of farm 
products 
34 12 30 35 42 64 
Livestock 
management 
20 (all farms) 
44 (livestock 
farms) 
25 21 21 12 19 
What farming 
activities to 
adopt 
14 12 16 9 8 36 
Processing 14 12 7 24 17 18 
Second row: q25_1 plus cases with missing sum (no decisions across); 
10. Cooperation 
More than 50% of respondents cooperate with other farmers in various farming activities. 
Cooperation is reported across all farm types, ranging from a high of more than 60% for collective 
DF and corporate farms to a relative low of 47% for single-family farms (Table 10.1).  
Table 10.1. Cooperation rates across farms of different types (percent of respondents) 
 All farms 
(n=142) 
Individual DF 
(n=16) 
One-family 
DF (n=57) 
Extended-family 
DF (n=34) 
Collective DF 
(n=24) 
Corporate 
(n=11) 
Joint activities with 
other farmers 
53 50 47 53 63 64 
Membership in a 
formal association 
44 57 42 53 37 18 
DF association  25 44 25 29 17 9 
Water users 
association 
28 25 30 32 25 18 
 
The most widespread area of cooperation is machinery pooling – joint use of farm machinery for 
cultivation and other purposes (48% of respondents; see Figure 10.1). Sharing of transport (for 
shipments to the market or for delivery of farm inputs) and cooperation in marketing or in input 
purchasing are each reported by more than 10% of respondents. Processing is the least popular 
activity for cooperation, reported by just 5% of respondents. Some respondents also mention 
cooperation in consulting and exchange of experience, but their number is very small (less than 2%), 
presumably because these options were not listed explicitly but left to the respondents discretion as 
part of the “other” category. 
Most of the farms that report joint farming activities with others are also members of a formal 
association (75%). Membership in a formal association generally implies membership in a water 
users’ association (65% of association members), membership in an association of dehkan farms 
(58%), or membership in both (23%).  
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Figure 10.1. 
 
The satisfaction rating of dehkan farm associations among their members is very low: 70% of 
respondents who are members in DF associations report that the association does not help at all 
(Figure 10.2). Some assistance is provided with machinery for field works and with seeds; 
assistance with sales, consulting, and training is reported very infrequently. 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
Figure 10.2. 
 
11. Climate change and frequency of extreme events 
Regarding climate change characteristics (Table 11.1), there is consensus on three attributes: the 
frequency of pests and plant diseases has increased, the vegetation period has become longer, and 
there is less precipitation and less snow cover.  Consistently with the view of less precipitation, most 
respondents perceive a higher frequency of droughts and periods of excessive heat (Table 11.2). 
Strong winds and sandstorms are also perceived to have increased to a certain extent. The frequency 
of mudslides, floods, and frosts is generally not perceived as having increased. A surprising result in 
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Table 11.2 is the general ignorance of the respondents as to the state of the glaciers: 74% have no 
opinion on the subject of glacier melting.  
 
Table 11.1. Climate change characteristics: last 10 years (percent of respondents) 
 Observed Not observed Not sure 
Vegetation period: shorter 18 25 57 
Vegetation period: longer 37 8 55 
Precipitation: less 68 13 19 
Precipitation: more 14 44 42 
Snow cover: less 67 11 22 
Snow cover: more 9 44 47 
Penetration of saline water into the soil 20 22 58 
Increased frequency of pests and plant diseases 63 8 29 
 
Table 11.2. Frequency of extreme events: last 10 years (percent of respondents, sorted by decreasing 
“confidence”) 
 Increased Unchanged Decreased Not sure 
Droughts 78 8 7 7 
Periods of excessive heat 58 16 6 20 
Strong rains 23 25 21 31 
Strong winds 35 20 10 35 
Strong snowfall 11 11 41 37 
Periods of excessive cold 12 25 24 39 
Mudslides 18 19 20 43 
Strong hail 13 19 25 43 
Floods 7 25 19 49 
Strong sandstorms 23 9 7 61 
Avalanches 10 6 11 73 
Melting of glaciers 9 6 11 74 
 
12. Taxes, social benefits, insurance 
Practically every farm pays taxes, which is basically the unified tax (88% of respondents) and the 
social tax (77%).  Many respondents (30%) report paying both the unified tax and the land tax 
(Table 12.1). In these cases the land tax presumably applies to the household plot (“presidential 
land”), not the dehkan farm, where land tax is incorporated in the unified tax. Local taxes – retail 
sales tax, transport tax, and property tax – are reported less frequently, with the retail sales tax at the 
top of the ranking with 42% of respondents.  
Table 12.1. Frequency of tax payers among the surveyed farms (percent of respondents) 
 All farms (n=142) Family-based DF Collective/corporate types 
Pay taxes 88 86 94 
Unified tax 88 86 94 
Land tax 32 31 34 
Social tax 77 72 91 
Retail sales tax 42 37 57 
Transport tax 15 10 31 
Property tax 11 7 26 
 
Overall, farms of different types show the same tax payment rate, with slightly higher payment rates 
among corporate farms (Figure 12.1). Significant differences are only observed in case of the social 
tax and local taxes: collective DF and corporate farms show a higher tendency to pay these taxes 
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than family-based DF.  This proves again the common truth that it is easier to collect taxes from 
large formal organizations than from family farms. 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
Figure 12.1. 
 
The situation with social benefits appears to be dismal. Only 20% of respondents report that farm 
members are entitled to receive at least one of a range of five social benefits (other than pension) 
and 27% report that members are entitled to a pension – either from the state or from the dehkan 
farm (Table 12.2). In all cases the entitlement rate is significantly higher among members of 
collective and corporate farms (Figure 12.2). While these low figures may reflect partial 
misunderstanding of the question (e.g., some respondents may have thought they were being asked 
about benefits they actually receive, not benefits to which members are entitled in general), the 
results overall point to low awareness of and low access to social benefits among rural people. 
 
Table 12.2. Perceived entitlement to social benefits among farm members (percent of respondents) 
 All farms (n=142) Family-based DF (n=107) Collective/corporate types 
(n=35) 
Pension 27 22 40 
Other social benefits 21 14 43 
Including:    
Sick leave 16 7 43 
Maternity leave 17 10 37 
Childcare allowance 13 7 34 
Disability allowance 4 3 9 
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Figure 12.2. 
 
Insurance is not a common risk-reducing tool among Tajik farmers. Only 27% of respondents carry 
any type of insurance (Table 12.3). The most popular approach is to insure the harvest (16% of 
respondents) and the vehicles (12%). Deviating from the pattern observed for taxes and social 
benefits, harvest insurance is more frequent among family-based dehkan farms (17% compared with 
14% for collective and corporate farms). Other forms of insurance are more frequent in collective 
and corporate farms (Figure 12.3). There is negligible awareness of the need to insure immovable 
property or take out personal insurance (health and life). 
Table 12.3. Insurance among surveyed farms (percent of respondents) 
 All farms (n=142) Family-based DF (n=107) Collective/corporate types 
(n=35) 
Carry any type of insurance 27 28 26 
Harvest 16 17 14 
Vehicles 12 9 20 
Immovable property 5 4 9 
Health and life 4 4 6 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
Figure 12.3. 
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Collective and corporate farms are more likely to have an accountant (77%) than family-based farms 
(44%). See Figure 12.4. Among family-based farms, there is an increasing progression from 
individual DF (19% with an accountant) to one-family DF (46%) to extended-family DF (53%). 
These trends may suggest that increasing organizational complexity makes the need for an 
accountant more obvious. 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
Figure 12.4. 
 
More than 75% of respondents have a work book (same proportions for family-based and collective 
farms), although there are indications that in some cases the work book is associated with an 
alternative place of work (school, military service), not the dehkan farm. The work book is generally 
kept at home, especially in family-based farms. In collective and corporate farms there is a higher 
tendency to leave the work book in the office or in the care of the farm head (Table 12.4). 
Table 12.4. Availability of a work book among farm members 
 All farms (n=142) Family-based DF (n=107) Collective/corporate types (n=35) 
Have workbook 76 77 74 
Kept at home 54 58 40 
Kept in the office 20 16 34 
 
Table 12.5. Why people do not create dehkan farms? (percent of respondents) 
 All farms (n=142) Family-based DF 
(n=107) 
Collective/corporate 
types (n=35) 
Shortage of machinery, inputs 59 62 49 
High taxes 50 51 46 
Complex, non-transparent process 27 27 26 
Too expensive 56 52 69 
Outside interference 16 13 26 
No farming experience 27 27 26 
Difficulties with documents 20 22 14 
No social protection 25 25 23 
Other 4   
 
A glimpse into institutional difficulties of dehkan farming is provided by a question that explored 
the views concerning reluctance to set up an independent farm (Table 12.5). Shortage of machinery 
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and inputs, including water, is at the top of the list, identified by 59% of percent as an obstacle. It is 
followed high costs and high taxes (56% and 50% respectively). All other factors are considered less 
serious obstacles. Members of family-based DF generally have a more severe view of the difficulties 
faced than members of collective farms, except on two counts: more members of collective farms 
view the separation procedure as costly and many more members of collective farms are deterred by 
prospects of outside interference (investors, authorities). In both instances, these concerns are 
probably fueled by the specific experience of collective DF members as distinct from members in 
family-based farms. 
13. Access to information and legal issues 
Table 13.1 lists the respondents’ answers to a series of 17 questions about their rights that were read 
to them by the interviewers. More than 50% of respondents knew their rights in 7 out of the 17 areas 
listed. The knowledge rate was particularly high (more than 70%) in the important areas of 
independence (“you are the owner of your production and revenue”) and freedom to farm (“you are 
free to decide what crops to grow”). Most people also knew about security of tenure and their right 
to withdraw with a plot of land. There is less confidence in issues relating to business activities 
(such as entering into contracts and agreements or erecting service buildings) and less common legal 
points (compensation for indivisible joint property). There is glaring ignorance about the right to 
social benefits (which is consistent with the results on social benefits in the previous section, see 
Table 12,2, Figure 12.2). 
Table 13.1. Legal rights perceived by members of dehkan farms  
 Percent of 
yes answers 
(n=142) 
Helvetas 
survey 
(Mar2011) 
A. High awareness issues   
You are the owner of your production and revenue 70 51 
You are free to decide what crops to grow 78 27 
You may withdraw with your land share to create a dehkan farm 59 19 
You may exit with your land share regardless of consent of other members 58 16 
You have the right to receive compensation if your land is taken away 55 44 
You may transfer your land use rights to another person 54 11 
You have the right to receive an equivalent plot if your land is taken away 53 35 
B. Medium awareness issues   
You may conclude contracts and agreements for conducting entrepreneurial activity 47 15 
You are free to enter into any contracts or agreements 42  
You may construct service buildings on your land 38 26 
You may buy, lease, or accept into temporary use the assets of other persons or 
organizations 
37 11 
C. Low awareness issues   
You have the right to receive insurance payments after a natural disaster 28  
You may mortgage your land use rights 24 11 
You are entitled to choose or express preference as to what plot to receive on exit 24 9 
You are entitled to compensation when joint property cannot be divided 21 9 
You are entitled to receive social benefits for sickness, maternity, childcare, etc. 18  
You may use the underground minerals and deposits on your land 10 10 
 
Farmers show considerable thirst of knowledge: most of the legal topics relating to the activity of 
dehkan farms aroused the interest of more than half the respondents (Table 13.2). Farmers showed 
relatively less interest in questions of termination, liquidation, and reorganization of a dehkan farm 
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and in contracts used for dehkan farm activitiy. Additional issues that were noted in respondents’ 
comments include information on social benefits and social insurance. Only one respondent noted 
that “all the necessary information is available”, and he was offset by another respondents who 
bluntly indicated that “information on all topics” was needed. 
Table 13.2. Topics on which more information is desired by respondents 
 Percent of yes answers (n=142) 
Law of Dehkan Farms, rights and obligations of a dehkan farm 68 
Land and land use in Tajikistan 56 
Contracts used by dehkan farms for their activity 35 
Financial accounting and taxation of dehkan farms 65 
Inheritance law 49 
Turning to courts of law 51 
Termination, liquidation, and reorganization of a dehkan farm 39 
Other issues 4 
 
Land conflicts are generally referred to the jamoat chairman or the district land committee (Table 
13.2). Head of dehkan farm and oblast authorities (the hukumat) are less popular options for conflict 
resolution, although turning directly to the police (“law enforcement organs”) is surprisingly 
reported as an option by 42%. Recourse to Legal Aid Center or lawyers is reported by less than 
10%, but this obviously depends on the actual spread of LACs in the area of the survey – a topic that 
requires further examination. Traditional mediation methods, such as turning to a respected elder in 
the village, play a marginal role today. The high priority of the jamoat chairman and the district land 
committee on our list matches the results of the recent Helvetas survey (March 2011); however, the 
low priority of the dehkan farm head (ranked fifth in our survey) is in contrast to the results of the 
Helvetas survey, where the dehkan farm head is preferred by 82% of farm members as the option for 
resolving land conflicts.  
Table 13.2. Who do you turn to resolve a land conflict? 
 Percent of yes 
answers (n=142) 
Helvetas survey 
(March 2011) 
Head of dehkan farm 26 82 
Jamoat chairman 63 30 
A respected person in the village (an elder, the local mullah, etc.) 6  
Oblast government (hukumat) 31 8 
District land committee 52 27 
Legal Aid Center 9 6 
Private consultant or lawyer 9  
Police 42  
Other (association, “among ourselves”) 2  
 
Nearly half the respondents (46%) are of the opinion that the legal and administrative environment 
has improved as a result of the land reform in the last two years. Table 13.3 lists the dimension in 
which improvements are identified. Only irrigation receives a poor score for no improvement in the 
last two years. 
Farmers receive training and practical information mainly from international organizations and local 
NGOs (51% of respondents), but also from the state extension and consulting service (19%). 
Overall, 62% of farmers access this information channel (Table 13.4). A much smaller proportion of 
farmers (22%) have actually worked with international organizations, benefitting mainly from seed 
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and fertilizer distribution programs. Within this group, 41% of farmers received both seeds and 
fertilizers and another 38% received seeds only; only one respondent received fertilizer without 
seeds. Overall, 80% of farmers working with international programs benefited from distribution of 
inputs. Another important benefit from international organizations is obviously participation in 
trainings and workshops, reported by 47% of farmers working with international organizations (or 
11% of all farmers).  
Table 13.3. How has the legal-administrative environment improved in the last two years? 
 Percent of yes answers (n=142) 
Better legal-administrative environment overall 46 
Easier to obtain a certificate of land use rights 24 
Greater freedom in choosing what crops to grow 42 
Fewer administrative obstacles 30 
Better irrigation 7 
 
The training and consultation numbers are additionally broken down by district in Table 13.4. This 
breakdown is used as the basis for the spatial picture presented in Map 13.1. 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
The gray shades indicate the percentage of people who received “any training”: 
 Black 88-100 (4) >80 
 Dark gray 70 75 75 63 (4) 61-80 
 Medium gray 46 56 60 50 44 (5) 31-60 
 Light gray 25 (1) 10-30 
 White 0 9 (2) <10 
The red figures indicate the percentage of people who received training from a state agency, the yellow the 
percentage of people who received training from international organizations. 
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Table 13.4. Distribution of training and consultation activities by district (percent of respondents) 
Districts 
q47: Did you receive any training or advice in agricultural 
activities? 
q49: Did you work with international organizations? How did they help? 
Number 
respondents 
Any ag 
training, 
extension 
advice 
State 
extension, 
advisory 
service 
Private 
organizations 
International 
organizations 
Number 
respondents 
Worked with 
international 
organizations 
Fertilizer Machinery Seeds Training 
All sample 142 62 19 3 51 142 22 10 1 18 11 
GBAO 24 29 13 8 21 24 8 4 0 8 4 
Roshtqala 11 9 0 0 9 11 0 0 0 0 0 
Shugnon 13 46 23 15 31 13 15 8 0 15 8 
RRP  48 81 40 2 60 48 23 13 0 21 10 
Varzob 8 75 75 0 13 8 25 13 0 25 0 
Vahdat 16 94 38 0 82 16 6 6 0 6 6 
Rasht 8 75 25 13 38 8 63 25 0 63 25 
Rudaki 8 50 13 0 50 8 38 25 0 25 25 
Shahrinav 8 100 50 0 100 8 0 0 0 0 0 
Sughd  27 44 11 0 33 27 26 11 4 19 11 
Asht 9 44 11 0 33 9 11 0 0 0 0 
Ghonchi 10 60 20 0 40 10 30 20 0 30 20 
Penjiket 8 25 0 0 25 8 38 13 13 25 13 
Khatlon  43 70 5 2 67 43 28 9 2 21 14 
Bokhtar 8 63 0 0 63 8 13 13 0 13 0 
Kabodien 3 0 0 0 0 3 0 0 0 0 0 
Muminabad 8 88 13 0 88 8 63 25 0 63 13 
Temurmalik 8 100 0 0 100 8 63 13 0 25 50 
Farkhor 9 56 11 0 44 9 0 0 0 0 0 
Shaartuz 7 71 0 14 71 7 14 0 14 14 14 
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